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JAMES W. NICKEL

THE LIBERTY DIMENSION OF HISTORIC AND
CONTEMPORARY SEGREGATION

Rereading Plessy v. Ferguson' invites reflection on historic and
ongoing racial segregation in the United States. This essay pursues
an enriched understanding of what was - and is - wrong with racial
segregation by developing a diagnosis of segregation as an infringement of basic liberties. Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy criticized
the requirement of segregation that blacks and whites sit in separate
train cars in exactly these terms: "The fundamental objection ... to
the statute is that it interferes with the personal freedom of citizens." 2
A more standard diagnosis of what was - and is - wrong with
segregation is in terms of equality, and uses concepts such as the
denial of equal opportunity, economic exploitation, and the imposition of an inferior social and political status. My purpose in focusing
on the liberty dimension of segregation is to supplement rather than
undermine diagnoses that emphasize the inequality dimension of
segregation. But a diagnosis of segregation in terms of liberty has
the advantage of avoiding anachronism since it appeals to values that
were already widespread in 19th century America. It is also possible
that it will grip people who don't find compelling a diagnosis in
terms of economic inequality.
We should be careful, however, not to exaggerate the difference
between liberty-oriented and equality-oriented critiques of segregation, because the former also appeals to an ideal of equality, namely
equality of basic liberties. One criticism of segregation - which
seems to be the one that Justice Harlan was making - is that it
infringed the liberties of both blacks and whites to associate as they
pleased. But another criticism, which partially explains why segre1

163 U.S. 537 (1896).

163 U.S. 537 at 557 (1896). A few pages later Harlan said that blacks rightly
objected to "the proposition that citizens of the white and black races can be
adjudged criminals because they sit, or claim the right to sit, in the same public
coach on a public highway" (p. 561).
2
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gation wronged blacks far more than whites, is that segregation was
a system of deeply unequal liberties.
The first section offers a description and analysis of racial segregation as it existed around the turn of the century in the United States.
The second section develops in some detail the diagnosis of segregation as a violation of basic liberties, attending to both its legally
and socially enforced components. The final section considers the
extent to which the same diagnosis applies to contemporary racial
segregation. Throughout I pay attention to what sort of conception
of liberty is being employed.

I. HISTORIC SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES

-

In the 1870s many whites who had been comfortable with slavery
were far from willing to accept blacks as political equals. But political equality for blacks was what the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments prescribed.3 A central part of such equality
was that blacks were to be free to use public places and facilities;
to move, live, and work where they wanted; and to vote, participate in politics, and serve in public offices. To have blacks enjoying
these liberties on equal terms with whites was unacceptable to many
southern whites 4 , and as soon as they were sure they could get away
with it they constructed a system - segregation, or "Jim Crow"
that reimposed political inequality by depriving blacks of the vote
and by restricting important liberties such as freedom of association,
freedom of movement, and free choice of occupation. 5 By the 1890s,
3 For a history of "Freedom and Repression in the Post-War South." see Paul
Finkleman, "Introduction: The Law of Freedom," Chicago-KentLaw Review 70
(1994): 325-368. See also David A. J. Richards, Conscience and the Constitution:
History, Theory, and Law of the Reconstruction Amendments (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1993).
4 This was true of many northern whites as well. Segregation of free blacks in
northern cities was common in the early nineteenth century, and hence northern
segregation antedated the southern version. See Leon E Litwack, "Segregation
in the Antebellum North," in Joel Williamson, ed., The Origins of Segregation
(Boston: D. C. Heath, 1968), pp. 88-95.
5 See C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1966); John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom:A History
of Negro Americans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, third edition, 1967); and Joel
Williamson, After Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965).
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when Plessy's unsuccessful challenge to segregated trains was made,
many areas of life had been formally divided into different areas for
blacks and whites.
Segregation involved both exclusion and separation. Exclusion
of blacks occurred in areas such as voting, political participation, and
service in public offices. Substantial numbers of blacks voted during
Reconstruction and shortly thereafter. But efforts by the Ku Klux
Klan and others to discourage blacks from voting began early on,
and by the late 1870s a widespread effort to disfranchise blacks was
underway. Means of doing this included complicated registration and
voting procedures, poll taxes, literacy tests, and white primaries. 6
Segregation applied to most areas of life. Areas of separation
included churches, schools, neighborhoods, the workplace (although
segregation here was limited by the important economic role of black
farmers and workers), and public facilities such as trains and busses,
hospitals, stores, restaurants, hotels, parks, and beaches. 7 The main
places where blacks and whites mixed together were on the streets
and roads, in (some) stores, and in (some parts of) the workplace.
To analyze segregation in more detail, we can say that it divided
social space into four sectors. First, there were shared and unsegregated sectors such as roads and sidewalks. Second, there were
shared but segregatedsectors such as trains and (some) parks. Here
the same (or an inferior version of the same) services or facilities
were available to blacks as to whites, but there were segregated areas
within them. This type of social space was the natural home of the
separate but equal doctrine that Plessy v. Ferguson sanctified. Third,
there were unsharedand segregatedareassuch as schools, churches,
and potential marriage partners. This area offered blacks indepen6 See Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, pp. 324-343, for a good account of
disfranchisement.
7 Franklin gives a nice summary of this:
Beginning in Tennessee in 1870, Southerners enacted laws against intermarriage of the races in every Southern state. Five years later, Tennessee adopted
the first "Jim Crow" law and the rest of the South rapidly fell in line. Negroes
and whites were separated on trains, in depots, and on wharves. Toward the
end of the century the Negro was banned from white hotels, barber shops,
restaurants, and theaters, after the Supreme Court in 1883 outlawed the Civil
Rights Acts of 1875. By 1885 most Southern states had laws requiring separate
schools.
From Slavery to Freedom, p. 342.
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dence from whites and the opportunity to develop and run their own
institutions. But it also limited blacks to what was available in their
own community. And fourth, as we saw earlier, there were areas of
exclusion such as voting and other forms of political participation.
Movie theaters, for example, could fall into any of these sectors
depending on how they were arranged. They could be shared and
unsegregated if blacks and whites were free to attend the same theaters and could sit wherever they wanted (the arrangement we have
today). They could be shared and segregated if blacks and whites
used the same movie theater but blacks were restricted to a particular section such as the balcony (the most common arrangement
during segregation). Theaters could be unshared and segregated if
there were completely separate ones for blacks and whites. Or there
could be exclusion if there were no movie theaters that blacks were
permitted to attend.
The means whereby segregation was imposed varied by sector.
Segregation in areas of government provision or facilitation such as
elections, police and legal services, schools, parks, and public transportation was explicitly decreed and enforced by law. Segregation
in stores, restaurants, and theaters was sometimes decreed by law,
but was also sometimes structured and enforced by the whites who
owned and operated the facilities - with backup support from the
police if needed. For example, eating establishments usually refused
to serve blacks at tables or counters, but were sometimes willing
to sell food for consumption outside. Social segregation was often
imposed through custom and social pressure - with facilitation from
the system of segregated schools and churches, and with backup
support from vigilantes and lynch mobs.
In the economic area, segregation and exclusion were often
restrained by the economic value of blacks as workers and customers.
For example, whites often wished to employ black sharecroppers and
laborers, and hence had reasons to tolerate the racial togetherness
this required. Initially, sharecropping, manual labor, and domestic
service were the main economic options available to blacks. Later, as
educational opportunities improved, some African-Americans found
jobs as teachers in black schools, as shopkeepers in black neighborhoods, and as doctors for black patients. But segregation served to
keep blacks mostly located in certain occupations and parts of the
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economy. It did this through the limitation of educational opportunities and discrimination in hiring. Blacks were systematically
excluded from positions having authority over whites.

II. SEGREGATION AS A VIOLATION OF BASIC LIBERTIES

The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s made extensive use of
the rhetoric of freedom. Was this just an attempt to play to favored
American values, or were there important ways in which segregation
deprived people of liberty? The rhetoric of liberty rightly played an
important role in emancipation, when the slaves were literally set
free from slavery, but perhaps the 20th century use of this rhetoric is
just a carryover from the past that now has little substance.' In this
section I attempt to show that this is not true; that historic segregation
involved substantial violations of basic liberties. 9
Keeping apart two groups that live in the same territory and under
the same government usually requires the use of social and legal
norms that tell people quite clearly where they can and can't live,
where they can and can't go to school, where they can and can't work,
and with whom they can and can't associate. This is particularly true
if one of the groups doesn't want to be segregated, or so thoroughly
segregated. Segregation's standing barriers to action in key areas of
liberty were often reinforced through dramatic events such as arrests,
beatings, murders, and lynchings, and hence deprivations of liberty
had a saliency that structural inequalities often lacked. Because of
this, it is not surprising that a familiar complaint against segregation
was that it made African-Americans unfree.
A. A Negative Conception of Liberty

The claim that historic segregation violated basic liberties will be
most robust and have the widest appeal if it does not depend on an
See Robert William Fogel, Without Consent or Contract: The Rise and Fall
ofAmerican Slavery (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), pp. 393-400 for a concise
account of what was wrong with slavery. The first point in his moral indictment
is that "slavery permitted one group of people to exercise unrestrained personal
domination over another group of people" (p. 394).
9 For legal and historical essays exploring this theme, see the symposium on
"The Law of Freedom" in the Chicago-KentLaw Review 70 (1994): 325-800.
8
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exotic or contentious conception of liberty. Accordingly, the conception of liberty that I will use in discussing segregation will be
standard and largely "negative." 10 It takes liberties to consist in the
absence of impediments to action in specific areas. The areas of
liberty that I will focus on are ones that are widely recognized as
important or "basic."" Unfreedom in some area, on this view, is
having one's choice and action in that area blocked by external barriers such as social or legal prohibitions, discrimination, and threats
of harm or violence. 12 On this view of freedom, not having enough
money to buy a trip to China is not a source of unfreedom, but being
unable to buy such a trip because travel to China is legally forbidden or because one is black and travel agents refuse to sell tickets
to blacks is a restriction of one's freedom. On the negative view,
freedom is concerned with some but not all of the things that limit
a person's power, opportunities, and actual abilities to act in certain
ways.

There are, however, some "positive" elements in the conception
of liberty that I will use. One is a claim against government to protect one's basic liberties. Another element that might be considered
"positive" is found in the fact that I will take freedom of politi10 On the contrast between negative and positive conceptions of liberty see

Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958);
and Gerald MacCallum, "Negative and Positive Freedom," PhilosophicalReview
76 (1965): 312-334.
11 John Rawls takes respect for basic liberties to be the first requirement of
social justice. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1971), and PoliticalLiberalism(New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993). See also James W. Nickel, "Rethinking Rawls's Theory of Liberty
and Rights," Chicago-KentLaw Review 69 (1994): 763-785.
12 In analyzing the liberty dimensions of historic and contemporary racial segregation I will focus on legal and social barriers to action and choice that are external
and imposed by others. An alternative approach might emphasize internal barriers
to action such as hopelessness, an inability to imagine feasible alternative actions
and ways of living, dependency on welfare with a consequent lack of confidence
in one's ability to cope with the world of work, and aversion to facing possible
discrimination and rejection. One might argue that many inner-city blacks suffer
from these sorts of internal barriers to action as a result of racism, segregation,
and discrimination, and that the unfreedom of many black Americans and its connection with segregation cannot be understood or combatted without taking these
sorts of internal barriers into account. For a discussion of this sort of conception
of liberty, see Nancy J. Hirschman, "Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom,"
PoliticalTheory 24 (1996): 46-67.
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cal participation to imply a duty of governments to offer citizens
opportunities to vote in regular and meaningful elections.
It might be objected here that to give an adequate analysis of
historic and contemporary segregation we need a stronger, more
positive conception of liberty that equates unfreedom with powerlessness. When riots and violent confrontations with police occur in
largely-black urban areas, as they recently did (November 1996) in
St. Petersburg, Florida, community leaders who attempt to diagnose
the causes of the violence often report that many black residents
feel powerless. They feel trapped in a bad situation and unable to
do much to escape it. Perhaps they are not literally powerless in the
sense of being unable to do anything, but their effective abilities to
act in important areas such as education, housing, and business are
substantially lower than those of most whites. And these lower-thanaverage abilities to act are at least partially due to historic segregation
and ongoing discrimination. Here one might follow Amartya Sen in
defining equal freedom as equal functionings and capabilities.13 But
I will not take this approach for two reasons. One is that, as noted
above, my argument will be of more general interest if it doesn't
depend on a strong and controversial conception of freedom. The
other is that this conception of freedom collapses the distinction
between two valuable ideals: equality of basic liberties and equality of opportunity. I endorse both of these ideals, and will illustrate
below some of the ways that they are linked, but I think that they
are interestingly different and are better left separate so that they can
make their distinctive contributions.
B. Unequal Liberties

As I suggested in the introduction, a society could be criticized on
liberty grounds if no one enjoys basic liberties, or if some people
enjoy them while others don't. The latter criticism appeals to an
ideal of equal basic liberties. My treatment of historic segregation
will make both kinds of criticisms. It will say that segregation made
everyone - that is, both blacks and whites - less free in important
areas such as association. It will also criticize segregation for being
a system of unequal liberties, for giving whites freedom in areas
13 Amartya Sen, "Freedom Of Choice: Concept and Content," European Economic Review 32 (1988): 269-294.
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where blacks were restrained. A liberty to do something is unequal
if one group is free to do that thing and another isn't, or if one group
has a much larger liberty in that area than the other.
Most people today who espouse liberty as a political ideal are in
favor of equal basic liberties, i.e. liberties that all citizens enjoy in
roughly the same measure or degree. But this was not true in 19th
century America. Many whites valued liberty, but were not in favor
of giving it fully to blacks. They favored, and ultimately imposed, a
system of unequal freedom.
Real liberty is a matter of the genuine absence of certain barriers,
not merely of laws saying that those barriers should be absent. And
two persons or groups enjoy equal liberty when they both enjoy
the actual absence of certain impediments to action, not merely
the same prescriptions of liberty. Partisans of liberty promote legal
prescriptions of liberty as a means to real liberty, but as with other
means these legal prescriptions sometimes get confused with their
end. So if the law proclaims equal liberty for whites and blacks, but
only whites enjoy the freedom and have it protected by government,
this is still unequal liberty. And if the law prohibits sexual relations
between blacks and whites, but punishes blacks but rarely whites
when interracial liaisons occur, this is also unequal liberty (or if you
prefer, unequal unfreedom).
C. Segregationgenerally

If we look at segregation as a whole, it substantially infringed
freedom of association; freedom of movement and residence; free
choice of occupation and other economic liberties; and liberties to
vote and participate politically. It also created a scheme of unequal
liberties in most of these areas. Although these liberties all receive
constitutional recognition in the United States today, my arguments
are not intended as arguments in constitutional law. They are rather
arguments in political philosophy, or in the theory of human rights. 14
14 All of the basic liberties discussed here are declared to be universal human
rights in contemporary human rights documents. For example, the International
Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights (1966) treats freedom of association in
article 22; freedom of movement and residence in article 12; free choice of occupation in article 8; and liberties to vote and participate politically in article 25. For
an attempt to develop a philosophy of human rights, see James W. Nickel, Making
Sense of Human Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
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1. Freedom of association

Association with others takes many forms including friendship, love
and sexual intimacy, family ties, the relations of neighbors and fellow
citizens, religious affiliations, and all sorts of social, political, and
commercial alliances. 15 People's interest in freedom of association
is the interest in not having substantial barriers to entering, refraining
from entering, and withdrawing from such relations.
Historic segregation severely limited the freedom of blacks and
whites to associate across racial lines. It placed substantial social
and legal barriers in the way of those who would form interracial
friendships, love affairs, families, churches, schools, or community
organizations. To prevent the formation of such relations it kept
blacks and whites apart, putting them in separate neighborhoods,
schools, churches, and occupational areas. When such associations
formed in spite of these measures, they were subject to legal prohibition, as with interracial marriages, and to severe social sanctions
including violence.
Keeping blacks from associating with whites was a key purpose
of segregation. But segregation also limited the liberty of whites
to associate with blacks. Most whites didn't want to associate with
blacks, except perhaps on a business basis in some areas, but the
relevance of this to liberties is small for two reasons. First, large
populations are seldom uniform in their desires. Some whites did
want to associate with African-Americans for purposes such as
friendship, family relations, 16 religious evangelism, economic profit,
and sexual relations. Second, liberties can be valuable even though
only a few people desire to make use of them. For example, the
liberty to leave one's historic place and take up residence elsewhere
is valuable even when most people prefer to and actually do stay
On freedom of association see Kenneth Karst, "Paths to Belonging: The
Constitution and Cultural Identity," North CarolinaLaw Review 64 (1986): 303377; and Aviam Soifer, "'Toward a Generalized Notion of the Right to Form or
Join an Association': An Essay for Tom Emerson," Case Western Reserve Law
Review 38 (1988): 641-670.
16 Recall Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (ruling unconstitutional Virginia's prohibition of interracial marriage). See also the account of interracial
marriages in Mississippi in 1870-85 in Vernon Lane Wharton, "Jim Crow Laws
and Miscegenation," in Joel Williamson, ed., The Originsof Segregation(Boston:
D.C. Heath, 1968): 14-20, at p. 19.
15
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put. In my opinion, segregation significantly infringed the freedom
of association of both blacks and whites.
But segregation also created a system of unequal liberties in the
area of association. Whites were far less likely to be punished, legally
or socially, for associating with blacks than blacks were for associating with whites.
The denial of associative liberties had real costs to blacks because
whites controlled most of the assets they needed in order to make
educational and economic progress. By being blocked from free
access to whites, blacks were thereby blocked from access to many of
the assets that whites controlled. Thus, unequal liberties contributed
greatly to unequal opportunities.
A possible objection to the analysis presented here is that a condemnation of segregation in terms of freedom of association doesn't
take seriously enough the liberty to dissociate - which is surely an
important part of freedom of association." What about the liberty
interests of those whites who didn't want to associate with blacks,
and who didn't want their children to have opportunities to associate
with blacks? It is clear that freedom of association leaves one free
to refuse to be friends with, talk to, or remain located close to persons one finds distasteful for whatever reason. But it is an entirely
different matter when one group uses the power of law and threats
of social violence to keep another entire group away from it and its
children. Freedom of association doesn't give a dominant group the
right to confine an entire group in a separate social realm.
2. Freedom of movement
A person who is imprisoned or even under house arrest suffers
greatly reduced abilities to act in a multitude of areas. Freedom
of movement is the liberty to go - and stop - where one pleases
within the limits of respect for the liberty and rights of others. The
American system of apartheid, unlike the South African one, did not
use internal passports and roadside checkpoints to monitor whether
blacks were in, or traveling to, areas for which they had residence
On dissociation see Pamela J. Smith, "We are Not Sisters: African-American
Women and the Freedom to Associate and Dissociate," Tulane Law Review 66
(1992): 1467-1515; and Robert W. McGee, "The Right to Not Associate: The
Case for an Absolute Freedom of Negative Association," UWLA Law Review 23
(1992): 123-148.
17
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permits. Segregation in the U.S. nevertheless substantially infringed
freedom of movement because it prevented blacks from going - and
stopping - where they pleased without fear of harassment, violence,
or arrest. Segregation was a system of unequal liberties of movement.
Blacks were expected to stay out of white areas unless they had
white-authorized business in them, and some white towns forbade
blacks to stay after sundown.
Further, the Jim Crow system inhibited the ability of blacks to
travel by excluding them from the only available hotels and restaurants along public railroads and highways. Plessy presents us with
a skewed picture of historic segregation since blacks were on the
same train, albeit in separate cars. As long as blacks were on the
same trains, they had the same opportunities for travel as whites
assuming they could afford the tickets. But in many areas there were
completely separate systems of services, and the fact that blacks were
almost always poorer and in some areas fewer than whites meant that
the services available to them were sometimes very limited. Hotels,
for example, didn't usually have separate areas within the same hotel
for whites and blacks. The social space for hotels was not shared and
segregated, as with trains, but was rather unshared and segregated.
In cities with lots of blacks there were rooming houses and hotels for
blacks, but along highways and in cities with few blacks, places to
stay were often severely limited. In general, if people are restricted
to the services and opportunities offered by their own communities,
smaller and poorer groups will often face severely restricted options.
This is one of the many links between the denial of basic liberties
and the denial of equal opportunity.
3. Free choice of residence

Residence is closely related to movement; it is the liberty to choose
a new place as one's temporary or permanent home, along with the
liberty to resolutely stay in one's native place if one wishes. As we
just saw, during segregation blacks were unwelcome in many areas,
especially if they showed any inclination to stay. African-Americans
were expected to reside in their own neighborhoods, and if they
moved it had to be from one black area to another. Discrimination in
access to housing was - and continues to be - a major barrier to free
choice of residence by blacks. Eventually, many blacks did succeed
in moving to the north, midwest, and west. But when they arrived
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housing discrimination usually restricted them to particular areas of
town.

Segregation didn't much limit the liberty of whites to enter and
stop in black areas, or to reside where they wished. The restrictions
imposed on blacks' freedoms of movement and residence created a
scheme of unequal liberties.
4. Free choice of occupation and other economic liberties
My main concern here is the freedom to choose and pursue an
occupation, employment, or business. Related liberties include the
freedom to hold and transfer property on equal terms with other
citizens, and the freedom to pursue and enter into economic arrangements and enterprises on equal terms with other citizens. Under
slavery occupational choice for blacks was almost totally absent.
Slaves did whatever sort of labor was ordered by their masters, and
they couldn't leave their jobs or try to find new ones. Emancipation gave blacks the liberty to choose their jobs or line of work, but
their options were greatly limited by poverty, lack of education, and
the fact that only a few areas of work were open to them. Initially,
blacks were restricted to sharecropping, manual labor, and domestic
service. Later, with industrialization, blacks had access to jobs in
steel mills and factories, but were frequently restricted to certain job
categories. As with discrimination in housing, job discrimination
followed blacks as they moved north and west. Segregation violated free choice of occupation because it confined blacks to certain
sorts of jobs through discrimination in education and hiring. It also
restricted economic opportunities by limiting where blacks could
go and stay, and by limiting associational opportunities that could
lead to employment or business. Segregation limited the economic
liberties of whites since it prevented them from employing blacks
in occupational areas that were reserved for whites - and sometimes these restrictions had significant economic costs. But the main
criticism here is in terms of unequal liberties. Segregation severely
restricted free choice of occupation for blacks, while imposing no
such restrictions on whites.
In this section and the previous one, I have assumed that people
can be made unfree by discrimination. But is this plausible? If blacks
are legally free to seek any job, for example, but are subject to job
discrimination from a significant percentage of employers, does this
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infringe their liberty to free choice of occupation? I think the answer
is affirmative. When the members of a group face discrimination
in hiring today, they typically don't face a uniform or monolithic
policy. Some employers will evaluate their qualifications fairly and
not discriminate; others will discriminate a little in the sense that they
hold people from the group to a stricter standard of qualification; yet
others will discriminate a lot but might be willing to hire people from
the group in exceptional cases; and still others may be unwilling to
hire people from the group under any circumstances. Because of
this, discrimination isn't always an insuperable barrier to getting
a job. Sometimes one can get around it by being very qualified,
or by having the right connections, or through ingenuity. However,
discrimination is still an impediment to liberty. But don't barriers
have to be insuperable to be impediments to liberty? I don't think so.
A legal prohibition of doing something backed by a substantial fine
or penalty if one is caught and convicted is a paradigm of a barrier
to liberty. Yet legal prohibitions are usually far from insuperable
barriers to doing what is prohibited.
5. Politicalliberties
These include freedoms to vote in fair and meaningful elections, to
petition government, to serve in public office, to engage in political
speech, protest, organization, and assembly, and to register complaints of violations of law and use state and federal courts. 18 In
most Southern states African-Americans were excluded from voting and other forms of political participation from roughly 1890 to
1965. Disfranchisement of blacks allowed whites to avoid living
under the "rule" of blacks, and helped stabilize the Jim Crow system
by preventing blacks from using their votes to protest segregation
and inequality. Other rights of political participation were violated as
well. In the South it was very dangerous for blacks to make political
speeches, to assemble and protest, and to organize politically. 19
Political liberties are the clearest example of how segregation created a system of unequal liberties. After 1990, whites had a monopoly
18 See Christopher Waldrep, "Black Access to Law in Reconstruction: The Case
of Warren County, Mississippi," Chicago-KentLaw Review 70 (1994): 583-624.
19 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,357 U.S. 449 (1958) (rejecting as
unconstitutional Alabama's demand for the membership lists of the state chapter
of the NAACP).

272

JAMES W. NICKEL

on political power, and blacks had extremely limited political liberties. To use the analysis of social space presented in the first section,
political activity was not even a shared but segregated area with
different systems of political participation for blacks and whites. 20
Until the final decades of southern segregation, political activity was
simply an area from which blacks were excluded.
D. Plessy v. Ferguson

Plessy's challenge was to just one small part of the Jim Crow system.
He said that he shouldn't be subject to criminal penalties for refusing
to sit in the black section of the train. The Louisiana statute requiring
segregation on trains imposed a fine or imprisonment for sitting in
the wrong section. It also penalized railway officials if they failed
to administer the racial division. It is clear that this statute limited
liberties; it used criminal penalties to require blacks and whites to
sit in designated cars and to prohibit them from sitting together. But
were the liberties sufficiently important ones, and was the restriction
of those liberties sufficiently large?
It is clear that important liberties were restricted by segregation on
trains. Freedom of association was limited by a scheme that required
blacks and whites to stay apart while traveling on trains. Freedom
of movement was limited by the fact that blacks who wished to
travel by train had to submit to a humiliating system of segregated
cars. And important economic liberties were limited by the fact that
blacks could not work with, work for, or sell things to whites on
trains because they could not enter the cars reserved for whites.
It might be argued, however, that the restrictions that train segregation imposed on these liberties were not very large, and hence
that train segregation by itself can't be viewed as a significant
infringement of basic liberties. Suppose that for safety reasons train
passengers were required to sit in single-person "capsules" that
would protect them in case of a train crash. This requirement would
greatly restrict associational and economic opportunities on trains,
but people would still have ample opportunities for association
elsewhere, and thus we would probably conclude that this safety
20 The South African system of apartheid used shared but segregated systems
of political participation by having a separate legislative branch for "coloreds."
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requirement does not restrict associational opportunities to a significant degree.
One answer to this objection is that in evaluating small restrictions on liberty we should attend to their purposes. The purpose of a
small restriction on liberty is relevant not only to seeing if there is a
justification for the restriction, but also to understanding its meaning.
A restriction on association intended to promote train safety may be
less objectionable on liberty grounds than a restriction on association intended to restrict association between two groups. One of
the main purposes of segregation was to restrict association between
blacks and whites, and it did this in a multitude of areas. 21 Segregation kept blacks separate for whites in most spheres of life, and the
beliefs of whites about blacks that made them demand such separation were profoundly insulting to blacks. 22 Another response is that
blacks didn't have ample opportunities elsewhere for association
with whites. Segregation greatly reduced associational opportunities between blacks and whites. It initiated the still ongoing social
isolation of blacks.
E. An objection

Does the liberty diagnosis of segregation give an adequate explanation of how Jim Crow was mainly an injustice to blacks? An
adequate diagnosis of what was wrong with segregation needs to
explain its asymmetrical character: how it deeply wronged AfricanAmericans while hurting whites to a much smaller degree. Yet
under a liberty-oriented diagnosis, we see that many of the barriers imposed by segregation limited the liberties of both blacks and
whites. Hence it seems doubtful that a liberty-oriented diagnosis of
what was wrong with segregation yields an adequate account of the
For a good discussion of the purposes that segregation served for both blacks
and whites, see Joel Williamson, After Slavery, pp. 275-279.
22 One of the most outrageous passages in the majority opinion in Plessy denies
this:
21

We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored
race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it.
163 U.S. 537 (1896), at p. 551.
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asymmetrical character of segregation. Perhaps only a diagnosis in
terms of inequality can do that.
There are a number of good responses available to this objection.
First, the asymmetrical character of the injustices perpetuated by
segregation can be at least partially accounted for by emphasizing
that segregation was a system of unequal basic liberties. Of the five
areas of liberty discussed above, in four of them the main complaint
against segregation was that it created a system of unequal liberties (movement, residence, occupation, and political participation).
Second, these unequal liberties resulted in inequality of opportunity.
The same barriers that created unequal liberties also created unequal
opportunities for movement, education, and employment. Although
equal opportunity is not the same ideal, in my opinion, as the ideal of
equal liberty, the two ideals do work in tandem to explain how segregation wronged African-Americans. Finally, the message sent by
the imposition of a system of segregation and unequal basic liberties
was deeply insulting to blacks and flattering to whites. Segregation
was based on the belief that blacks, in contrast to whites, had negative characteristics that made them unworthy of equal basic liberties.
As John Rawls has emphasized, denial of equal basic liberties to a
person or group is deeply insulting and especially harmful to selfrespect.23 Segregation's unequal liberties were wrong not just in the
greater restrictions they imposed on blacks, but also in the deep
insult that they conveyed. As Joel Williamson put it:
Separation also facilitated the subordination of the inferior race by constantly
reminding the Negro that he lived in a world in which the white man was dominant,
and in which the non-white was steadfastly denied access to the higher caste.
Further, the impression of Negro inferiority would be constantly re-enforced by
relegating the baser element, whenever possible, to the use of inferior facilities.24
23 Rawls is worth quoting on this point:
[S]elf-respect is most effectively encouraged and supported by the two principles of justice, ... precisely because of the insistence on the equal basic
liberties and the priority assigned them ... The importance of self-respect is
that it provides a secure sense of our own value, a firm conviction that our
determinate conception of the good is worth carrying out. Without self-respect
nothing may seem worth doing, and if some things have value for us, we may
lack the will to pursue them.
"The Basic Liberties and Their Priority," PoliticalLiberalism, p. 318.
24 Joel Williamson, After Slavery, p. 276.
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III. CONTEMPORARY SEGREGATION AND LIBERTY

The United States is still in a segregated country three decades
after the demise of legally authorized segregation. Separation
between blacks and whites continues to be substantial in housing,
where at least half of African-Americans still live in largely-black
neighborhoods; 25 in schools, where housing segregation causes
many African-American children to attend largely-black schools;
in churches, where integration is extremely limited; and in social
networks, where association between blacks and whites outside of
the workplace is still limited.
Ongoing segregation is perpetuated by many factors. First, there
is what we might call inertia, the adherence of both blacks and
whites to patterns of living that were established during the Jim
Crow era. In some cases we might describe this as loyalty, as
when African-Americans continue to value and support their historic churches and colleges. But in many areas inertia is just a
matter of people doing what they and their families have always
done - and in the case of most whites that means keeping separate
from blacks. Second, ongoing segregation is promoted by the onaverage lower levels of income of blacks than whites, which make
it harder for black families to move to new neighborhoods and to
put their children in integrated private schools. Third, segregation is
perpetuated by ongoing discrimination, especially in housing26 and
25

See Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segrega-

tion and the Making of the Underclass (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1993).
26 See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., "How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent
Integration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 143 (1995): 1595-1658. Johnson suggests
four causes of residential segregation: (1) "racism no doubt continues to exist
and to cause whites to resist living with or around Blacks in integrated neighborhoods" (p. 1609); (2) "the outward flight of whites to suburbia ... is clearly
a factor in maintaining residential segregation patterns in an era in which overt
racism has diminished and lost favor" (p. 1611); (3) "the existence of government and private lender policies that discriminate against Blacks in the residential
housing market in such a way as to restrict Blacks' choice of housing locales"
(p. 1611); and (4) "poverty" (p. 1614). See also Michael H. Schill and Susan M.
Wachter, "The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated
Poverty in Urban America," University ofPennsylvania Law Review 143 (1995):
1285-1342.
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employment.2 7 Although such discrimination is illegal, there is no
doubt whatever that it continues at a substantial level. In housing, African-Americans face discrimination when they try to rent
as well as when they try to buy. Realtors often don't take blacks
to see housing that is for rent or sale in white areas, and landlords
often refuse to rent to blacks. In some all-white neighborhoods,
blacks still face hostility and even violence from their new neighbors when they move in. A fourth factor follows from the third.
Experiencing discrimination and hostility is extremely unpleasant,
and a psychological aversion to facing it yet again surely causes
many blacks to remain within largely-black neighborhoods and
institutions.

Segregation is still supported by restrictions on basic liberties.
Legally-authorized segregation and discrimination are gone, so there
are no longer legal barriers to free association, movement, residence,
or choice of employment. But there are still social strong barriers
in these areas. These include ongoing discrimination in housing
and employment, and violence against blacks who attempt to integrate white neighborhoods. Ongoing segregation has components
that continue to infringe the basic liberties of African-Americans.
Today's segregation is often described as "de facto" rather than "de
jure," but this is misleading if it is taken to mean that segregation is
no longer actively supported by the discrimination. And the active
maintenance of barriers in housing and employment still delivers
the insulting message that whites believe that African-Americans
are unworthy of association with them and their children.

IV. CONCLUSION

Even if we stick with a largely negative conception of liberty, as
I have in my analysis, we find that both historic and contemporary
segregation involve significant infringements of equal basic liberties.
The ideal of equal basic liberties supports a powerful indictment of
On employment discrimination and stereotypes see Joleen Kirschenman and
Kathryn M. Neckerman, " 'We'd Love to Hire Them, but ... ': The Meaning of
Race for Employers," in Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson, eds. The Urban
Underclass (1991), Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991, pp. 203232.
27
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both historic and contemporary segregation. When applied to racial
segregation in the United States, the rhetoric of liberty has real
substance.
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